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THE UNIQUENESS OF THE WARREN AND BURGER
COURTS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
P. ALLAN DIONISOPOULOS*
INTRODUCTION
W ith the confirmation of four new justices President Nixon has
now reshaped the Supreme Court along lines promised in 1968."1
Few Americans, and least of all President Nixon, are likely to take
issue with that judgment. "As a judicial conservative," the President
had said, "I believe some Court decisions have in the past gone too
far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in
our society."'2 His attitude toward "activist" Warren Court decisions
which were "soft" on criminals and promoted desegregation through
school busing3 was made clear to the electorate during the 1968
presidential campaign. Following his election, he felt justified in
redeeming his campaign pledge "to nominate to the Supreme Court
individuals" who shared his judicial philosophy.4 This promise was
presumably kept with the appointments of Warren Burger in 1969,
Harry Blackmun in 1970, and Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist
in 1971.5
The man on the street, editorial writers, policemen, county
prosecutors and the Court's critics in Congress were not dismayed
by the President's providing a new direction to the Court by appoint-
ing "strict constructionists." That which had been promised by Nixon
in 1968 was in keeping with the law and order rhetoric of prior years
and reflected the widespread resentment of the "activist" Warren
Court, as shown, for example, in the popular tendency to place the
blame for growing crime in the streets at the doorstep of the Supreme
Court. Brown v. Board of Education6 sparked a negative reaction
* Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University. B.A., University of
Minnesota, 1948; B.S., M.A., 1950; Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1960.
1. Yoder, Book Review, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 23, 1972, Book World, at 1, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 4.
3. 26 CONG. Q. 2160 (1968).
4. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 4.
5. Powell and Rehnquist became members of the Court on January 7, 1972.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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which gained momentum in both public and private circles following
the "prayer in school" cases7 and the Court's limiting state authority
in criminal proceedings. The latter was accomplished by extending
the applicability of virtually all of the procedural safeguards of the
Bill of Rights to the states."
Those Americans who were so bitter in their denunciation of
Chief Justice Warren must have taken comfort in knowing that
President Nixon's appointees were strict constructionists. They may
also have found satisfaction in the Nixon appointees' responses in
procedural due process cases." On the other hand, President Nixon's
criticism of the Warren Court, his self-proclaimed judicial conserva-
tism, and his promise to nominate persons who shared his judicial
philosophy were reasons for dismay in liberal circles. This concern
was shortly borne out by the Burger and Blackmun dissents in the
Pentagon Papers Case.'0 Liberal, anti-war activists equated these dis-
sents to a repressive pro-government, anti-free press position, and
the unanimity of the four Nixon appointees in the Death Penalty
Cases," in Laird v. Tatum12 and in several first amendment cases.' 8
7. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
8. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trials in felony cases); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
(prejudicial comment on the defendant's claiming the privilege of non self-incrimina-
tion); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel
or unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (unreasonable searches
and seizures).
9. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (pretrial confession given to
policeman, posing as a fellow prisoner); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no
attorney present at lineup); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (convictions by
jury majorities rather than by unanimous verdict). But cf. United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
10. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 748, 759 (1971).
11. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
12. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). The majority's rejection of the appellees' claim is firmly
grounded in the Court's longstanding criteria, as identified by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Standing to sue may only be claimed by
those whose rights have been abridged.
The disposition of this case by a 5 to 4 vote was a principal reason for objections
in the liberal community. Since the four Nixon appointees, including Justice Rehnquist,
who had been elevated to the Court from the Department of Justice, had stood together
against the appellees, liberals felt that there were ample grounds for requesting a re-
heating. Specifically, they wanted Rehnquist to disqualify himself by reason of his
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Our discussion to this point has underscored the apparent dif-
ferences between the Warren and Burger Courts. However, it is my
intent to show that both the conservatives and liberals have been
reacting largely on what is perceived to be the President's design.
Certain decisions of the Burger Court in civil rights and fundamental
freedoms cases can be of little comfort to conservatives. Nor have
liberals correctly judged the record of the Burger Court. What has
not yet been perceived on either side of the political spectrum, even
as Warren Burger begins his fourth year as Chief Justice, is that
comparisons of the records of the two Courts, especially in criminal
cases, do not tell the whole story. Beyond the procedural due process
cases, in which the divergencies of the Burger from the Warren Court
were most pronounced,14 lie other constitutional developments which
highlight the similarities between the two Courts.
Only brief mention of recent civil rights decisions is needed.
Much more noteworthy because of their distinctive and unique char-
acter in American constitutional history are recent fundamental free-
doms cases. These place Chief Justice Warren and Burger in a niche
in American constitutional history never occupied by any of their
predecessors. Of the fifteen men who have served as Chief Justice since
1789, only Warren and Burger may claim the distinction of having
presided over Courts which invalidated national laws on first amend-
ment grounds, 15 protected the right to travel under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment 6 and dealt the executive branch a
severe blow in declaring national security concerns insufficient to
justify warrantless electronic surveillance of political extremists.17 The
last decision, United States v. United States District Court,8 turned
former post in the executive branch. Had Rehnquist not participated in the case, the
Court would have divided 4 to 4, and the lower court ruling, against military sur-
veillance, would have prevailed. Because of the publicly announced intent to request a
rehearing and the disqualification of Rehnquist, the latter took the unprecedented step
of submitting a later, published opinion as to why he did not believe that he should
disqualify himself. 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972).
13. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
752 (1972); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
14. Cases cited note 9 supra.
15. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Subversive Activities Control
Bd. v. Boorda, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970), denying cert. to 421 F.2d 1142 (1969); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
16. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
17. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
18. Id.
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upon the fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures: but Justice Powell observed that internal "security cases
. . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values not present in cases of 'ordinary' crimes."'19
Burger's civil rights record is a continuation of the line of de-
cisions which began with Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.20 There
the Court nullified the state's practice of paying tuition fees so that
blacks could attend law school elsewhere. Later, the Court attacked
Jim Crowism on interstate carriers,21 state-enforced restrictive cove-
nants, 22 other forms of "state action" in support of private discrimina-
tory practices,23 and discrimination in public accommodations. 24 There
had been some exceptions within Burger's first three years as Chief
Justice. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,25 the Nixon appointees
unanimously rejected a black's argument that the "state action" doc-
trine forbade a private club's discriminatory practices. In Evans v.
Abney,26 a narrowly construed historic legal principle was accorded
preferred status over the blacks' claims of lost rights. And in Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park,27 the Chief Justice joined the dissenters
in what may be termed an anti-civil-rights stand. However, these de-
cisions excepted, there is little to distinguish Burger from Warren
in civil rights cases. Thus, by demanding immediate steps toward
desegregation 2s (a decision that contradicted Nixon's "Southern
strategy"), by eliminating a subtle, anti-black job placement prac-
tice,20 by nullifying North Carolina's anti-busing statute0 and by
ruling that busing is one tool of school desegregation,81 Chief Justice
Burger continued the civil rights course set by previous Courts. More
importantly, he placed himself in a position diametrically opposed
to the Nixon Administration on two of these issues-immediate de-
19, Id. at 313.
20. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
21. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
22. Shelleyv. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
23. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
24. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
25. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
26. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
27. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
28. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
30. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
31. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
740
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segregation and busing. Burger's civil rights record, as already re-
vealed in these several decisions, suggests anything but "self-restraint"
in that branch of American constitutional law.
Important though the Burger Court decisions have been in
procedural due process and civil rights cases, they cannot compare
in significance to the libertarian record established since the new
Chief Justice assumed his post in 1969. In the remainder of this
article we will focus chiefly upon eight decisions of the Warren and
Burger Courts. These are constitutional landmarks for various reasons.
First, they include the only cases in all American history in which
the Supreme Court nullified national statutes which abridged first
amendment freedoms.3 2 Secondly, they made operational the pre-
ferred freedoms doctrine, which found its origin in a case footnote
in 1938, 33 but which has been little more than a debate topic since
that year.34 Third, they fit into what we may call the Supreme Court's
libertarian era, which began with Tot v. United States (1943) 35 and
continues to the present. Fourth, they establish the Court as the
"Keeper of our Rights," something that Professor Warren claimed
32. Cases cited note 14 supra.
33. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
34. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); C.
BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 217-21 (1960); McKay, The Preference for
Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
35. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). In addition to Tot v. United States, the list of pro-
cedural due process cases includes: United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)
and United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) (compulsory self-incrimination
cases); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (which actually struck down pro-
visions of two laws); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); and
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
Bill of attainder cases include United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) and
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Expatriation cases include: Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
In O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), the Court limited Congress'
power to "make rules for the government and regulation' of the land and naval forces"
(U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14) in holding that an enlisted member of the armed
forces may only be tried in civil courts "for nonmilitary offenses committed off-post
while on leave." Justice Douglas' opinion does not specifically nullify the several articles
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, 934); but certainly
this decision renders a construction which effectively limits the application of those
statutory provisions. The O'Callahan decision had thus extended earlier limitations on
Congress' power to bring civilian employees and civilian dependents of servicemen at
overseas military installations within the jurisdiction of military court: McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S.
278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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in 1935 was already the role of the Supreme Court,36 but an assertion
that has often been rejected by other scholars in the years since then.87
Finally, on several occasions the Supreme Court rejected governmen-
tal claims that statutes s or actions 39 were essential to the preservation
of national security. The phrase, "the war power," Chief Justice War-
ren said, "cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support
any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its
ambit.' '40 That the Burger Court agreed with this assertion as to
both congressional and executive authority was shown in its disposi-
tion of Subversive Activities Control Board v. Boorda4' and United
States v. United States District Court.42
The foregoing points should be underscored, for they mark the
distinctively libertarian character of the Warren and Burger Courts,
and they contradict the claims of both liberals and conservatives that
the Supreme Court has been reshaped along "strict constructionist"
lines. By way of adding emphasis to these points, we may briefly
consider various commentaries by legal scholars and note earlier
instances in which individuals tried to persuade the Supreme Court to
act as "Keeper of our Rights."
I. THE COURT AS GUARDIAN OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
At particular times, emergencies, passions or prejudices may con-
vince the majority to disregard the rights of a minority. "It is then,"
Professor Warren declared,
that an enforceable Bill of Rights is essential to the citizen's
liberty, and it is then that a Congress vested with uncontrolled power,
and elected from the section or community of the majority, would
36. C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 149
(rev. ed. 1935).
37. See, e.g., R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CON-
FLICT AND CONSENT 166 (1967); D. LOCKARD, PERVERTED PRIORITIES IN AIERICAN
POLITICS 211 (1971); Dahi, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 292 (1957); Latham, The Supreme Court
and the Supreme People, 16 J. POL. 207 (1954); Sklar, The Fiction of the First Free-
dom, 6 W. POL. Q. 302 (1953).
38. Subversive Activities Control Bd. v. Boorda, 421 F.2d 1142 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); United States v. Robe], 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
39. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
40. United States v. Robe], 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
41. 397 U.S. 1042 (1970), denying cert. to 421 F.2d 1142 (1969).
42. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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be most likely to violate those rights. It is also not infrequent that
a party in power denies to the minority that very liberty which, when
itself in the minority, it ardently champions.
43
Warren then identified the Court as the chief enforcing agency, since
a historical survey revealed to him a number of instances in which
Congress had violated constitutional rights, and "at least ten times
has the Supreme Court saved the individual against Congressional
usurpation of power.' 44 If the record from the 1860's to the 1930's
had been that impressive to a leading constitutional scholar, both
advocacy of judicial supremacy and the characterization of the Court
as defender of civil liberties would seem amply justified.
However, for roughly thirty-five years thereafter other scholars
saw the Court in a different light. For example, in 1937, Judge Edger-
ton contradicted Professor Warren's findings. Taking issue with War-
ren and other supporters of judicial supremacy, Edgerton questioned
the utility of a judicial power that left untouched those national laws
which seriously affected civil liberties and were used largely to pro-
tect property rights or to promote the vested interests and rights of
an overly narrow segment of society. Judicial supremacy, Edgerton
contended, had served primarily "to entrench slavery," ensure the
oppression of blacks, deny compensation to injured workmen, "pro-
tected the hiring of women and children at starvation wages" and in
other ways do "harm to common men. 45
In still later years other scholars questioned the ambivalence of
justices, who were "activists" when it came to socio-economic legisla-
tion but "self-restrained" in civil liberties cases, or who failed to use
their power in both kinds of cases, 46 and they challenged as largely
illusory the notion that the Supreme Court stands in defense of con-
stitutional rights against Congress.47 The record has been such, Sklar
wrote in 1953, as to warrant a reconsideration of "the importance
of the First Amendment in American constitutional law."'48 He con-
cluded: "So in political prosecutions the First Amendment is, as
Justice Black sadly remarked, 'little more than an admonition to
43. C. WARREN, supra note 36, at 149-50.
44. Id. at 150.
45. Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress, 22 CORNELL
L.Q. 299, 348 (1937).
46. Latham, supra note 37.
47. Sklar, supra note 37.
48. Id.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Congress.' It was never more. ' 49 Except for a few decisions in proce-
dural safeguard cases, Professor Dahl could find little in 1957 that
would support a claim about the Court as protector of substantive
and procedural rights. Moreover, he wrote, "[i]n the entire history of
the Court there is not one case arising under the First Amendment in
which the Court has held federal legislation unconstitutional. ' 0
Apparently the long and unimpressive history of the Court in
civil liberties cases had so blinded some scholars that they failed to
see how radically that record had been altered between 1943 and
1971. For example, in 1967, Professor Dahl found scarcely any im-
provement upon the past record and even restated the point about the
Court's never having used the first amendment to nullify national
legislation.5 1 His contention reveals either an oversight on his part
or a failure to appreciate the first instance in which the Court did
protect a first amendment right in Lamont v. Postmaster General
(1965) .52 This error was further compounded in 1971, when Professor
Lockard, citing Dahl as authority, claimed that "never has a piece
of national legislation been declared unconstitutional" on first amend-
ment grounds. Lockard went on to declare that insofar as the Court
had stood as a bulwark, its decisions in national cases had involved
matters of a "relatively minor" nature.
53
Both the erroneous studies and the earlier scholarly publications,
which perceived the Court in a negative and ambivalent role in civil
liberties cases, serve to underscore how significantly the judicial posi-
tion has been changed within the past three decades, a period of time
that is only one-sixth of the total history of the Court. Instead of the
Court's decisions of the recent past involving "relatively minor mat-
ters," as- defined by Professor Lockard, they had imposed significant
limitations on congressional and executive power to protect substan-
tive rights and procedural safeguards. 54 Thus, by securing fundamen-
49. Id. at 319.
50. Dal, supra note 37.
5 1. R. DAHL, supra note 37.
52. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). Since Dahl does cite United States v. Romano, 382
U.S. 136 (1965) and United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), it is evident
that he should have had access to the Lamont decision as well.
53. D. LOOKARD, supra note 37. Obviously Lockard relied upon the previously re-
ported findings in Dahl's article of 1957 and book of 1967. Even though there may
have been a time lag of as much as a year between completion of manuscript and pub-
lication date, this does not justify Lockard's having overlooked Robel and Lamont,
cases which had been specifically decided on first amendment grounds.
54. See notes 14, 15, & 16 supra.
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tal freedoms against Congress, the Warren and Burger Courts had
carved for themselves a special place in that history.
We many now turn our attention to a brief exploration of the
historical background in order to bring these recent fundamental
freedom decisions into sharper focus.
II. THE HISTORY OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS DECISIONS
"For almost two centuries," Warren stated in United States v.
Robel5  "our country has taken singular pride in the democratic ideals
enshrined in its Constitution," the most cherished of which has "found
expression in the First Amendment." 56 Assuming this to be true, one
might question why the Court took so long in acknowledging first
amendment rights. We can scarcely claim that the Court had no
opportunity to do so, for there had been a number of cases in which
first amendment issues were present, and some of these found their
way to the Court.
57
So few first amendment cases had been brought to the Court's
attention between the enactment of the first national law, which ad-
versely affected fundamental freedoms (Sedition Act of 179858),
and the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917,59 and so many since
Schenck v. United States (1919) ,60 that it would appear, that funda-
mental freedoms had only been abridged in this century. This was
not the case, for, as this brief exploration of the historical record will
show, fundamental freedoms issues had been present on earlier occa-
sions, although some of them did not reach the Court.
For our purposes this history may be divided into three parts. The
first begins with the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798 and ends in
1919. The second period is initiated by Schenck and ends with
Aptheker v. Secretary of State (1964),61 a case involving a funda-
55. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
56. Id. at 264.
57. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ;Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
58. Ch. 78, § 1 et seq., 1 Stat. 596.
59. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
60. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
61. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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mental freedom-the right to travel-but which was decided by
reference to the fifth rather than the first amendment. Its significance,
as will be shown hereafter, is not lessened by reason of its not being
a first amendment case. The third era dates from Aptheher, the period
in which fundamental freedoms were protected against congressional
encroachment.
Serious though the abridgment of freedoms to speak and to
publish had been in the Sedition Act cases, 1798-1800,2 no one who
had been convicted thereunder took an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Indeed, since Federalists on the Supreme Court, in their concurrent
capacities as judges of the circuit courts, had already presided over
cases in which persons were convicted, there could "be no question
what [their] decision would have been" had an appeal gone to the
highest court.
63
The Sedition Act incorporated the common law rule on seditious
libel, the same rule under which Peter Zenger was tried in the well-
known freedom of the press case in colonial America."4 The Fed-
eralist-sponsored Sedition Act was sharply criticized by the Jeffer-
sonians in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 179805 on the
ground that it violated first amendment freedoms. Small wonder,
then, that the Jeffersonians, upon acquiring control of the national
executive and legislative branches following the elections of 1800,
were not inclined to give renewed life to the Sedition Act. What was
strange, contradictory, and in a sense more dangerous was the Jef-
fersonian Administration's use of the old common law rule on seditious
libel, now devoid of legislative sanction, in bringing Hudson and
Goodwin, the editors of the Connecticut Currant, to trial on charges
much like the political charges made under the Sedition Act. At least
in oblique fashion the Marshall Court protected freedom of the press
on this occasion, albeit against executive rather than legislative action.
There is no such thing as a federal common law crime, the Court de-
clared. Before a person may be charged and brought to trial, Justice
Johnson stated, Congress must define the act as a crime and prescribe
62. See J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 98-138
(1951).
63. Id. at 139. See also S. FRIEDELBAUM, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASE STUDIES IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 525 (1972).
64. See S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, 1 THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN RE-
PUBLIC 115 (1942); A. WEINBERGER, FREEDOM AND PROTECTION 90 (1963).
65. See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 529 (1888).
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the punishment.60 This was as close as the Court came in its earliest
history to protecting a fundamental freedom.
The Sedition Act of 1798 marked one point in American history
when Congress breached the first amendment. Not until the Civil
War were there other laws violative of fundamental freedoms. One
statute of 1862 which required the test oath or disclaimer affidavit
for public officeholders67 was specifically aimed at the Confederates
and their sympathizers. Given recent decisions,68 this act probably
fell within the scope of the first amendment. However, in nullifying
this statute (as amended in 1865) in Ex parte Garland,69 the Court
cited the constitutional prohibition on Congress' enacting a bill of
attainder. However, that decision neither extended to ex-Confederates,
who had been denied seats in Congress during Reconstruction, nor
protected the right of a constituency to be represented by a man of
its own choosing.
70
Another law enacted in 1862 and a more recent statute of 1882
raised questions about two provisions of the first amendment in rela-
tion to congressional power: freedom of religion and the establish-
ment clause. Anti-polygamy statutes of those two years71 were obvi-
ously directed against Mormons in the territories of Utah and Idaho.
They had been enacted under Congress' authority to "make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the territory ...belonging to
the United States." 72 This authority, the Court admitted in Reynolds
v. United States,73 does not permit Congress to abridge the free exer-
cise of religion. Congress may not regulate religious beliefs, the Court
stated, but it is "free to reach actions" that are contrary to social
duties or are "subversive of good order."74 Since polygamy had "always
66. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). See also L. LEVY,
JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 61 (1963).
67. Oath of Office Act of 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502, as amended, Oath of Office
Act of 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424.
68. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964).
69. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
70. See P. DIONISOPOULOS, REBELLION, RACISMl, AND REPRESENTATION: THE
ADAM CLAYTON POWELL CASE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS 83-92 (1970); Dionisopoulos, A
Commentary on the Constitutional Issues in the Powell and Related Cases, 17 J. PUB.
L. 103, 144 (1968).
71. 48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1971); Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2 et seq., 12
Stat. 501.
72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
73. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
74. Id. at 164.
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been odious" in the western world, its sanction by a religious order
did not bring it within the protective cover of the first amendment.
Davis v. Beason75 posed a different first amendment issue. The
anti-polygamy act of 1882 denied to those having more than one
wife the rights to vote and to stand for election to public office in
any territory of the United States.76 Since polygamy was one of the
religious doctrines of the Mormon Church, the appellant argued, the
act of 1882 violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Again the Mormons' arguments were rejected, the Court claiming
that the first amendment had never been intended "as a protection
against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace,
good order, and morals of society.
1 7 7
At least on the periphery of the first amendment was the issue
posed in Ex parte Jackson78 which dealt with the power of Congress
to exclude certain publications from the mail (e.g., birth control in-
formation, lottery tickets and obscene publications). While holding
that Congress could deny use of the postal system "for the distribu-
tion of matter deemed injurious to the public morals," Justice Field
also acknowledged that the liberty to circulate is as important to
freedom of the press as the right to publish79
There had been these few instances in the nineteenth century
in which fundamental freedoms questions were either squarely before
the Court or tangentially related to the first amendment. Much dif-
ferent was the situation in the second period, 1919 to 1964, when the
Court was frequently called upon to answer first amendment ques-
tions. This was especially true after the Court began to incorporate
provisions of the first amendment in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,80 thus enlarging its jurisdiction over cases
arising in the several states. The frequency with which such ques-
tions were brought to the Court's attention was quite different from
the favorable responses to demands for protection of individual rights.
The Court's unimpressive record, especially in national civil liberties
75. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
76. 48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1971).
77. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
78. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
79. Id. at 733, 736.
80. While Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), with its specific references
to the fourteenth amendment's protections of free speech and free press, is ordinarily
identified as the starting point, equally deserving of mention are Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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cases from 1919 onward, led to the critics' scorning "judicial self-
restraint" and to their complaints about the ambivalence of the
justices.81
It is not necessary to explore here a record that has already been
discussed extensively elsewhere.8 We need only allow that record t6
serve as a reminder that earlier constitutional history is so unlike that
of the third epoch in which-under Warren and Burger-fundamen-
tal freedoms finally found that judicial protection long demanded
by the Court's critics.
IlL. PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER THE
WARREN AND BURGER COURTS
In approaching this discussion about the significance of the funda-
mental freedoms decisions since 1964, it is first necessary to advance
and defend an argument about the relevancy of Scales v. United
States"8 to developments of the past several years. At the outset it
must be admitted that the Scales decision was not of the kind to be
acclaimed by libertarians nor to be greeted by those scholarly critics
who questioned the Court's role as protector of civil liberties. Never-
theless, while Scales favored the government's position as against
individual rights, the Court introduced an important statutory con-
struction that bore directly on later developments and contributed
substantially to the Court's nullifying portions of the Internal Secur-
ity Act of 195084 in Aptheker, Robel and Boorda v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board.8 5
At issue in Scales was the validity of the "membership clause"
of the Smith Act of 1940. The Smith Act proscribed advocacy or en-
couragement of the violent overthrow of the governments of the
81. See notes 35, 37, & 38 supra.
82. H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (1967); W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE
& THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962);
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM
IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (A. Kelly ed. 1958); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1960); P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-1969
(1972); C. PRITCHETT, THE AIERICAN CONSTITUTION (1968); 0. ROGGE, THE FIRST
AND THE FIFTH (1960).
83. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
84. 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1971).
85. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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United States and of its political subdivisions, and made it a crime
to be or to become a member of "any such society, group, or assembly
of persons . . ." knowing the revolutionary purposes thereof.80 Dennis
v. United States87 had already sanctioned that portion of the Smith
Act which proscribed advocacy. In Scales a divided Court could thus
discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a pur-
poseful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same for-
bidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection
from the guarantees of [the First] Amendment.
88
In reaching a decision about the validity of the "membership clause"
in the Smith Act, the majority relied upon a distinction previously
drawn by the Court between advocacy and the mere teaching of an
abstract doctrine.8 9 Building upon this prior distinction in Yates, the
majority declared in Scales that the statute did not proscribe mem-
bership per se. The "membership clause" as construed by the ma-
jority distinguished between "active" and "passive" members; and this
construction permitted the sustaining of Scales' conviction as an
"active" member of the Communist Party, and the overturning of
the conviction of Noto who was only a "passive" member.90
By rendering this statutory construction the five-judge majority
saved the Smith Act's "membership clause" from a successful first
amendment attack, an approach that was criticized especially by
Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion.91 Although subject to vigor-
ous criticism in some quarters, this statutory construction and the
Court's distinction between active and passive membership may, in
retrospect, be regarded as a breach in what appeared to be an im-
penetrable barrier-not around the first amendment but around
legislation intended to safeguard national security. Aptheker was the
first case to demonstrate this; and shortly thereafter, both Robel and
Boorda revealed how wide the cleft had become. Because these several
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1971).
87. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
88. 367 U.S. at 229.
89. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
90. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
91. 367 U.S. at 262-75. Separate dissenting opinions were presented by Justice
Brennan and Chief Justice Warren, whose objections stemmed from a provision of the
Internal Security Act of 1950 that specifically stated, "neither holding of office nor
membership in any Communist organization" could be regarded "per se a violation,"
50 U.S.C. § 783(f); and by Justice Black, who objected to balancing first amendment
-freedoms and national security interests as defined by the United States government.
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cases involved a common question-the relationship of intensity of
membership to proscribed conduct-they should be discussed in an
order which temporarily bypasses Lamont,92 even though this was the
first instance of the Court's nullifying national legislation on first
amendment grounds.
Although Aptheker involved the right to travel, a fundamental
freedom which found protection in the fifth rather than the first
amendment, it shared with all but two 3 of these recent civil liberties
cases a common element in that the legislation in question was in-
tended to foster or protect national security. Its special similarity to
Robel and Boorda lay in the fact that in all three cases provisions of
the Internal Security Act of 195094 were nullified because they
abridged fundamental freedoms. Finally, Aptheker established the
viability of derived rights as distinguished from the specified rights
of the first and other amendments. This was not the first appearance
of derived rights.9 5 Prior to 1964, derived rights had been protected
against state action by the fourteenth amendment.96 However, not
until Aptheker had such rights found protection against congressional
encroachment.
The principal issue in Aptheker stemmed from the provision of
the Internal Security Act of 1950 which denied American pass-
ports to certain categories of citizens. As soon as the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board identified a group as a Communist-action organi-
zation and issued an order directing the officers of the organization
to register with the Department of Justice, certain disabilities were
92. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
93. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971).
94. Another provision of this law, which required that individual members of
Communist-action organizations, so identified by the Subversive Activities Control
Board, register with the Department of Justice, was invalidated on the ground that this
required compulsory self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment. Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
95. E.g., freedom of association dates back at least to Dejonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937) and had previously been advocated by counsel in New York ex rel.
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 72 (1928), a case in which New York's anti-Ku
Klux Klan statute was sustained. Among other derived rights are (1) the right of
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); (2) academic freedom, Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); and (3) freedom of symbolic expression,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and United States v. O'Brien
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
96. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82 (1961); Schware v. New Mexico Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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imposed upon the group's members. It became "unlawful for any
member . . . to make application for a passport . . . or to use or
attempt to use any such passport."' Acting under statutory authority
the Department of State revoked the passports of two members of
the Communist Party, Herbert Aptheker and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.
They initiated suits, challenging the validity of the law. They con-
tended that it deprived them of their fifth amendment right to travel
outside of the United States. 98
The appellants' use of a constitutional provision other than one
protected by the first amendment apparently was dictated by the
Court's prior ruling in Kent v. Dulles.99 On that occasion the Court
stated that the right to travel is protected by the word "liberty" in the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.100 There was, however, an
important distinction between Kent and Aptheker in that the former
turned on the question of ultra vires: had the Department of State
exceeded its statutorily-conferred authority in denying "passports be-
cause of alleged Communist beliefs"? The Court found an ultra vires
act because Congress had not authorized State Department denials
of passports on this ground.10' This decision left unanswered the
question of whether Congress could constitutionally reach the same
national security objective by prescribing a similar prohibition in
law.
In deciding Aptheker the Court did not question the power of
Congress to safeguard national security. However, it did find several
constitutional infirmities in the law, most of which related in some
way to the intensity of membership issue, and any one of which might
have been ground in itself for invalidating the statutory provision in
question. First, the law indiscriminately embraced all members of the
organization, including those who did not know of the ultimate aims
of the Communist movement. 02 Second, the statute failed to dis-
tinguish between "the member's degree of activity in the organization
and his commitment to its purpose.' 03 Third was the possibility, as
previously suggested by President Eisenhower, of adequately protect-
97. 50 U.S.C. § 785(a) (1971).
98. 378 U.S. at 501-04.
99. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
100. Id. at 125.
101. Id. at 129-30.
102. 378 U.S. at 509-10.
103. Id. at 510.
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ing national security through means "more discriminately tailored
to the constitutional liberties of individuals.' 11 4 Finally, the Court
declared:
The section, judged by its plain import and by the substantive
evil which Congress sought to control, sweeps too widely and too
indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment. The prohibition against travel is supported only by a tenuous
relationship between the bare fact of organizational membership
and the activity Congress sought to proscribe.'0 5
Aptheker merely distinguished Scales. Nevertheless, the statutory
construction that the Court presented in Scales made possible the
tougher judicial stance in Aptheker and opened the door to the free-
dom of association decisions in Robel and Boorda.
Previous reference has been made to the disabilities imposed
upon members of Communist-front or Communist-infiltrated organi-
zations identified by the Subversive Activities Control Board. One
such disability had been the prohibition on members' acquiring or
using American passports. Another provision of the Internal Security
Act of 1950 made it unlawful for a member of one of these organi-
zations to "engage in any employment in any defense facility . . .106
Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party and a machinist at
a shipyard in Seattle, was indicted under this latter proscription. The
suit initiated against him posed questions which ultimately reached
the Supreme Court and made possible a judicial pronouncement
regarding the constitutionality of this statutory disability.
In 1961, the Supreme Court sustained an order of the Subversive
Activities Control Board which required that the Communist Party
of the United States be registered with the Department of Justice
as a Communist-action organization. 0 7 Thereafter the Board's regis-
tration order became final, and the several disabilities imposed by the
law on members of the Party took effect. Since the Secretary of De-
fense, acting under statutory authority, had already designated the
Seattle shipyard a "defense facility," Robel's continued employment
there brought him within the purview of the law. The indictment
charged that he did "unlawfully and willfully engage in employment"
104. Id. at 514.
105. Id.
106. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (D) (1971).
107. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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at a defense facility, knowing that the Party had been ordered to
register and that the employment disability provision was applicable
to him.10
8
The previously announced statutory construction in Scales obvi.
ously governed the thinking of the district court judge, who dismissed
the indictment. This provision of the law, the judge declared, is con-
stitutionally infirm unless it can be construed to mean "active mem-
bership and specific intent . ... "109 Since neither condition had been
alleged in the indictment, the case against Robel was dismissed.
A statutory construction of this nature appeared, at least on the
surface, to be in accord with that whereby the Supreme Court had
previously saved the Smith Act's "membership clause" in the Scales
case. However, the Supreme Court refused to follow the lower court.
Nor did it render its own statutory construction as a way of saving
the employment disability provision from constitutional attack. "We
cannot agree with the District Court," stated Chief Justice Warren,
"that § 5 (a)(1)(D) can be saved" by permitting it to be applied only
"to active members" whose purpose is to advance "the unlawful goals"
of Communist-action organizations. 10 The job disability section of
the law was in violation of freedom of association, a derived right
"which is protected by the provisions of the First Amendment." 111
The majority spoke with such regularity, embellishments, and
vigor about the importance of first amendment freedoms and what
they were designed to protect as to suggest the need for overruling
Scales and for rejecting the practice of construing statutes to save them
where fundamental freedoms are involved. Scales was not overturned,
however, nor did the Court lose sight of the balancing test-a bal-
ancing of concerns about national security and fundamental freedoms.
Warren stated that the majority was "not unmindful of the congres-
sional concern over the danger of sabotage and espionage in national
defense industries .... ."2 Therefore, the decision in Robel was not
to be read as a denial to Congress of the power to prohibit employ-
ment in "sensitive positions in defense facilities [to any persons] who
would use their positions to disrupt the nation's production facili-
108. 389 U.S. at 260.
109. United States v. Robe], 254 F. Supp. 291, 293 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
110. 389 U.S. at 262.
111. Id. at 263.
112. Id. at 266.
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ties." 113 Obviously this concession meant that the majority had not
moved toward the "absolutist" position so often advocated by Black
and Douglas." 4 On the other hand, neither had the Court sought to
save the law, as per Scales, nor had it been persuaded by the govern-
ment's argument that in the past the justices had deferred to Con-
gress' "war power." That phrase, Warren said, "cannot be invoked
as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional
power which can be brought within its ambit."" 5
Therein lay the great difference between Aptheker and Robel on
the one hand and earlier national security-war power cases on the
other. 10 This point was not lost upon the dissenters, who acknowl-
edged the Court's worthy motives in seeking to maximize individual
liberties and to balance the latter against the demands of national
security. However, Justices White and Harlan were also critical of
the majority in that it arrogated "to itself an independent judgment
of the requirements of national security. ' 1 7 In warning that judges
should be wary of making such determinations, the dissenters sub-
scribed to the government's argument that these matters are properly
the concern of Congress and demand "self-restraint" on the part of
the Court.
Boorda led to the invalidation of yet another provision of the
Internal Security Act of 1950. Petitioners Boorda, Archuleta and
Holley challenged the provision of the law which authorized the
Board to make public the names of members of Communist-action
organizations."" This provision, they contended, was unconstitutional
in that it authorized public disclosure "without a finding that the
individual concerned share[d] in any illegal purposes of the organi-
zation to which he belong[ed]." 119 This argument was in accord with
the Supreme Court's prior holdings in Scales, Noto v. United States,
20
113. Id. at 266-67. This apparent inconsistency was not overlooked by Justices
White and Harlan in a dissenting opinion. Id. at 284-85.
114. See, e.g., their concurring or dissenting opinions in New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-20 (1971); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80
(1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957); and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267
(1952). See also Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960).
115. 389 U.S. at 263.
116. Cases cited note 57 supra.
117. 389 U.S. at 289.
118. Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 788(b).
119. 421 F.2d at 1143.
120. 367 U.S. 290 (1960).
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Aptheker, and Robel. Each of these decisions influenced the thinking
of the District of Columbia Circuit. Chief Judge Bazelon declared
"that mere membership in the Communist Party is protected by the
First Amendment.' 121 Some members of the Communist Party may
be intent upon promoting illicit ends, but it may not be inferred
from this that all members automatically share the same goals, nor
that freedom of association permits an assumption of guilt by asso-
ciation. "[T]he fact that some members of the Communist Party
may be engaged in activity not protected by the First Amendment
does not mean that the [rights of] other members may be infringed."'12
To publicize the names of members would thus operate as an ob-
struction to the exercise of their freedom of association. Bazelon then
declared the offending provision violative of the first amendment.123
By denying the government's petition for certiorari on April 20,
1970, the Burger Court sustained the lower court's ruling and further
strengthened freedom of association as a right protected by the first
amendment. Apparently, as in Robel, not even a statutory construc-
tion could save the provision in question. The emerging trend gave
libertarians cause to hail that which was initiated by the statutory
construction in Scales and which led to the securing of freedom of
association against attacks in the name of national security in Boorda.
National security issues were also present in some form in three
of the other cases, Lamont,'24 Schacht v. United States25 and United
States v. United States District Court.26 It is not likely that those
Americans most concerned about national security would see the first
two cases as involving issues as explosive or dangerous as those in the
Internal Security Act cases. Nevertheless, the remoteness of the issues
in Lamont and Schacht from the more directly related national se-
curity questions in Aptheker, Robel and Boorda does not diminish
their importance as fundamental freedoms decisions.
At issue in Lamont was a section of the Postal Service and Federal
Employees Salary Act of 1962. Under this provision the Secretary of
the Treasury was empowered to classify as "communist political
propaganda" certain materials mailed from outside the United States.
121. 421 F.2d at 1147.
122. Id. at 1148.
123. Id. at 1149.
124. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
125. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
126. 407 U.S. 247 (1972).
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Such mail was to be detained by the postal service and to be de-
livered "only upon the addressee's request ... ", 12 Specifically exempted
by the law were "sealed letters," materials "furnished pursuant to
subscription," and mail which the Postmaster General had ascertained
was "desired by the addressee." 128
Two methods of construction were available to save this statu-
tory provision from a successful first amendment attack. First, because
of the exemptions prescribed in the law, the Court might have ruled
that there had been no violation of fundamental freedoms. For exam-
ple, an American scholar who was regularly engaged in the study of
political, social and cultural affairs of the Soviet Union or the People's
Republic of China could expect uninterrupted delivery of published
journals or newspapers under the second and third exemptions. Sec-
ondly, the postal service might have been able to: conceive a plan
for delivering the mail without violating the rights of the addressee.
Indeed, the postal authorities had initiated a new plan, after the
Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals, and they had previously offered
concessions to Lamont and Heilberg, after the latter sought to en-
join enforcement of the law. However, neither the manner in which
the statute was implemented nor its exemptions saved it from success-
ful first amendment attack.
Initially, to implement the provision that the mail be delivered
at the request of the addressee, the post office maintained a file of the
names of those who wanted to receive this kind of mail from commu-
nist countries. In March 1965, after the Supreme Court had agreed
to hear an appeal on the constitutionality of the law, a new practice
was introduced: an addressee was sent a notice which had to "be
returned for each individual piece of mail desired." Mail was not
delivered to those who did not return the card, the assumption being
that the addressees wanted "neither the identified publication nor any
similar one arriving subsequently."'' 2 The first practice smacked too
much of maintaining political dossiers; but neither the changed prac-
tice nor a specific concession made to Corliss Lamont saved this
provision of the law.
Rather than respond to a notice that a copy of the Peking Review
was being detained, Dr. Lamont sought "to enjoin enforcement of
127. 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a) (1963).
128. Id.
129. 381 U.S. at 304.
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the statute, alleging that it infringed his rights under the First and
Fifth Amendments."' 3 0 Postal authorities then notified Lamont that
by instituting the suit he had signaled "his desire to receive 'commu-
nist political propaganda' and therefore none of his mail would be
detained.'' Dissatisfied with this concession in that his name would
be included on the list of those who wanted to receive "communist
political propaganda," Lamont amended his complaint to question the
constitutionality of the statute. Since the impediment had been re-
moved, 32 his suit was dismissed as moot by the district court.
Leif Heilberg was separately notified by the post office that his
mail would not be detained. However, he also persisted in challeng-
ing the validity of the law, and a three-judge district court panel
unanimously declared the statutory provision null and void under
the first amendment.133 Each case thus made its way to the Supreme
Court, with Lamont as the appellant in one and the government
the appellant in the other.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas said that the new postal
procedures had not rendered the issues moot and the constitutional
question had to be answered. As construed and applied, Douglas
stated, the statutory provision was unconstitutional. By requiring
"an official act (viz., returning the reply card)," the law imposed "a
limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addresses' First Amend-
ment rights."134
Exactly which first amendment rights had been violated? The
exemptions in the law-such as the noninterference with mail "fur-
nished pursuant to subscription" and mail ascertained by postal authori-
ties "to be desired by the addressee"-assured delivery to these
addressees. And the postal service's announcement that it was no longer
maintaining a list of recipients of "communist political propaganda"
removed the implication that a political dossier was being compiled.
Nevertheless, the Court found the law to be constitutionally infirm.
Three first amendment rights are identifiable in the majority
and concurring opinions. The decision turned in part on a derived
right, academic freedom. Although scholars could subscribe to and
receive communist publications without interference by the post
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 229 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
133. Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405, 410 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
134. 381 U.S. at 305.
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office, nontenured teachers "might think that they would invite dis-
aster if they read what the Federal Government says contains the
seeds of treason." Others would also "feel some inhibition in sending
for literature which federal officials have condemned as 'communist
political propaganda.' "135 Freedom of speech was also threatened in
that the statutory provision was inimical to "the 'uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open' debate and discussion that are contemplated by the
First Amendment."136 Still a third right-freedom to receive-was
identified by Justices Brennan, Goldberg and Harlan in their con-
curring opinion. "It is true," they stated, "that the first amendment
contains no specific guarantee of access to publications.' 37 Neverthe-
less, the
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise will-
ing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would
be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers. 138
In identifying these several rights, both opinions enlarged the
dimensions of the specified freedoms of the first amendment and
demonstrated the significance that may be attached to derived rights.
Although not specifically identified as such, academic freedom and
the right to pursue knowledge could be inferred from Douglas'
statement about the statute's "chilling effects" upon nontenured
teachers and other prospective recipients. And his reference to debate
and discussion showed their importance to all forms of freedom of
expression. Finally, in recognizing the citizen's right to receive printed
matter, the concurring justices expanded existing freedoms. 139
Freedom of expression was also protected in Schacht another
fundamental freedoms case which bore a relationship, however tenu-
ous, to national security. Under section 702 of title 18 of the United
States Code, it is a crime for unauthorized persons to wear "the uni-
form or a distinctive part thereof" of the American military services.
40
Section 772 (f) authorizes a person to wear the uniform of the Army,
135. Id. at 307.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 308.
138. Id.
139. Similarly, in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), Justice Field had
acknowledged that the liberty to circulate is as essential to freedom of the press as the
right to publish,
140. 18 U.S.C. § 702 (1948).
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Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps "in a theatrical or motion-picture
production," providing "the portrayal does not tend to discredit that
armed force."' 141 On December 4, 1967, anti-war demonstrations were
carried on within the vicinity of the military induction center at
Houston, Texas. In a portrayal of a confrontation between American
soldiers and a Vietnamese woman, Schacht and others sought "to ex-
pose the evil of the American presence in Vietnam .... ,142 Schacht's
conviction and arrest came under the provision of the law which forbids
the unauthorized wearing of a uniform. His defense and appeal were
based on the statutory exception-the permission granted to use the
uniform in theatrical productions. Whether this was a theatrical pro-
duction within the meaning of the law was, in the estimation of
White, Burger and Stewart, a matter properly "left to the determina-
tion of the jury."'14
3
Most critical, of course, was the question of whether any of the
armed forces could be portrayed only in a "good" or "favorable"
light. All eight members of the Court 44 agreed, as stated in White's
concurring opinion, "that Congress cannot constitutionally distinguish
between" theatrical presentations that do or do not "tend to discredit"
the armed forces. To find otherwise, Justice Black said, would be to
leave "Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam," whereas such
persons as Schacht would be sent "to prison for opposing it .... "1
The discrediting proviso, he concluded, "cannot survive in a country
which has the First Amendment .... ,,1
46
Domestic reaction to the war in Vietnam was also a principal issue
in United States v. United States District Court. There was, however,
an important element not present in the Schacht case-violence. The
three defendants, John Sinclair, Lawrence Plamondon and John W.
Forrest, were charged with conspiring to destroy government prop-
erty, and Plamondon was also "charged with the dynamite bombing
of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan."47 The issue in this case, Justice Powell announced, "involves
141. 10 U.S.C. § 772(f) (1956).
142. 398 U.S. at 60.
143. Id. at 69 (concurring opinion). Justice Harlan took issue with the Court
only on a jurisdictional question raised by the government-the time limitation rule for
filing a petition for certiorari. Id. at 65 (concurring opinion).
144. Harry A. Blackmun took the oath of office approximately two weeks after
this decision was handed down.
145. 398 U.S. at 63.
146. Id.
147. 407 U.S. at 299.
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the delicate question of the President's power, acting through the
Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal
security matters without prior judicial approval."'148 For our purposes,
there are several relevant matters in this case. One, relating to internal
security, is whether the executive branch may conduct warrantless,
electronic surveillance of persons who seem intent upon attacking
and subverting the existing governmental structure. Another is
whether Congress may authorize the President to maintain warrant-
less electronic surveillance of such domestic security risks. A final
issue which arises primarily under the search and seizure limitations
of the fourth amendment is whether there is a blending of first and
fourth amendment values by reason of the political character of the
actions with which the defendants were charged.
The government contended that the warrantless surveillances
were lawful "as a reasonable exercise of the President's power . ..
to protect the national security."'149 The trial court answered that the
surveillance violated the fourth amendment and that the government
had to make a full disclosure to the accused of the intercepted con-
versations. This ruling was sustained by the Sixth Circuit, and the
United States then appealed to the Supreme Court.
At the heart of the issue is whether the executive branch may
claim authority to act by reason of the President's constitutional re-
sponsibility to protect national security. The government contended
that an answer could be found in title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,110 which states:
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as
he deems necessary to protect the United States against the over-
throw of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or
against any other clear and present danger to the structure of
existence of the Government.' 15
The foregoing might be interpreted in either of two ways. Congress
may have acknowledged that the President has the necessary authority
under the Constitution to act as is needed to protect national security.
Alternatively, Congress may have intended to except the executive
148. Id.
149. Id. at 301.
150. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20.
151. Id. § 2511(3).
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branch from the statute's carefully drafted limitations in national se-
curity matters.
Justice Powell rejected the government's claim that Congress in-
tended to sanction "a constitutional authority in the President to
conduct" warrantless surveillance in such cases. The statutory lan-
guage and congressional colloquy at the time the bill was being de-
bated made it clear that the government had not properly interpreted
legislative intent. Rather than conferring any power upon the Presi-
dent, "Congress simply left presidential powers where it found
them."'15 2 And instead of sanctioning presidential authorization of
warrantless electronic surveillance, Congress honored the fourth amend-
ment's limitation by stating that information intercepted by a presi-
dentially authorized wiretap
may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other pro-
ceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not
be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement
that power.15 3
The italicized language of this section is consonant with the fourth
amendment's requirement that there not be "unreasonable searches
and seizures," thus, no warrantless invasions of privacy, and it was in
keeping with the Court's 1967 ruling in Katz v. United States.1
54
In fulfilling his constitutional responsibility to protect the gov-
ernment against subversion, the President could not claim power
under either the Constitution or the statute to authorize warrantless
searches. Nor could Congress undermine the fourth amendment by
sanctioning use of warrantless electronic surveillance in internal se-
curity cases. Congress could distinguish between "ordinary" criminal
activities and domestic security threats. "Different standards may be
compatible with the Fourth Amendment," the Court advised, "if
they are reasonable both in relation" to the needs of government to
protect itself "and the protected rights of our citizens."' 5 This repre-
sented something other than a judicial invitation to Congress to
flaunt the fourth amendment.
While this decision turned on the fourth amendment, the Court
saw the case's important bearing on first amendment freedoms. To
152. 407 U.S. at 303.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968) (emphasis added).
154. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
155. 407 U.S. at 323.
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some extent Justice Powell accepted as valid the arguments voiced in
recent years by the New Left and black militants about "political"
crimes. There is, Justice Powell observed, a convergence in national
security cases "of First and Fourth Amendment values not present
in cases of 'ordinary' crime."'156 Consequently, judicial vigilance under
the fourth amendment is "more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political
beliefs."157
This concern about fundamental freedoms was in concert with
the other recent developments discussed above, but dealt a blow to
a presidential power which had been sanctioned by precedent. At
least as early as May 1940, presidents had authorized their attorneys
general to use wiretapping and electronic surveillance "in matters
'involving the defense of the nation.' "158 The setback for the Nixon
Administration was made more pronounced because (1) this was a
unanimous decision, and (2) three of the Nixon appointees, 59 with
Powell writing the opinion, voted against the President. Certainly,
a "strict constructionist" Court would have deferred this national
security question to the political branches.16 ) There was this evi-
dence, then, that the Burger Court was no more inclined than the
Warren Court to accept war power or national security as a talismanic
incantation to support all executive or legislative power which might
be brought within its ambit.161
The Burger Court had two additional opportunities to nullify na-
tional legislation on first amendment grounds. Tilton v. Richardson'62
and Blount v. Rizzi'6 3 did not involve war power or national security
issues, but their significance is not lessened thereby, as they contributed
to Burger's distinctive record of presiding over a Court which nullified
more national laws under the first amendment than any other Court in
our history.
156. Id. at 313.
157. Id. at 314.
158. Id. at 310-11 n.10. See also V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 135-55 (1971).
159. Rehnquist did not participate, presumably because of his prior association with
the Department of Justice. If that is the reason, there is a question about why he
participated the following week in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). He explains the
difference in his memorandum, Laird v. Tatum, 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972).
160. See cases cited note 57 supra.
161. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
162. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
163. 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
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Under title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, fed-
eral funds were made available to church-related colleges for the con-
struction of buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular educa-
tional purposes.6 4 One provision of this statute stipulated that the
"Federal interest" in any building would end after twenty years;"",
"therefore, a recipient institution's obligation not to use the facility
for sectarian instruction or religious worship" would expire at that
time. 6 6 In Tilton, the six-man majority accepted as constitutionally
justifiable the stated legislative policy of educating "this and future
generations of American youth" to promote the security and welfare
of the United States. 167 But it also concluded that if,
at the end of 20 years the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the
original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing
religion.
To this extent the Act therefore trespasses on the Religious
Clauses.' 68
Because the majority limited itself to this one provision, Justices
Black, Douglas and Marshall dissented. They were not disappointed
in the majority's nullifying the one section on first amendment
grounds, but felt that all public funding of church-related colleges
should have been nullified since, as Douglas stated, "even a small
amount coming out of the pocket of taxpayers" and paid to a church
is "not in keeping with our constitutional ideal."' 69
The issue, as presented in Tilton, was larger than what was spe-
cifically ruled upon by the majority. On other occasions, including
two consolidated cases 70 decided on the same day as Tilton, the Court
had used the establishment clause, as made operational through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in striking down
state policies and practices.' C' But Tilton involved the first national
law to be found incompatible with the establishment clause.
164. 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2).
165. Id. § 754(a).
166. 403 U.S. at 683.
167. Id. at 678.
168. Id. at 683.
169. Id. at 697.
170. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
171. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitalc, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Blount dealt with a congressional scheme to prohibit the sending
of obscene materials through the mail. Section 4006 authorized the
Postmaster General "to stamp as 'Unlawful' and return to the sender"
any mail and "to prohibit the payment of postal money orders" if
the evidence convinced him that the purpose was for "obtaining or
seeking money through the mails for 'an obscene ... matter' " or to
distribute through the mail information on "how such items may be
obtained."'172 Section 4007 empowered national district court judges
"to order the defendant's incoming mail detained pending completion"
of administrative proceedings and a showing of "probable cause."'
173
In Freedman v. Maryland,174 a case originating in the state courts,
the Supreme Court had established certain guidelines to govern ad-
ministrative censorship, including prompt administrative proceedings
and a judicial proceeding to evaluate the censor's claim that the
material was not protected under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. 7 5 "These safeguards," the Blount Court announced, "are lack-
ing in the administrative censorship scheme created by §§ 4006, 4007,
and the regulations."'' 76 It thereby concurred in judgments already
reached by three-judge panels of the Central District of California
and the Northern District of Georgia. Both of the lower courts de-
clared the provisions violative of the first amendment in light of the
Supreme Court's previous ruling and guidelines in Freedman.
77
The government made an effort to prevent the Court from
reaching the constitutional question "by construing that section [4006]
to deny the administrative order any effect whatever" until judicial
review, as requested by the distributor, had been completed. 78 This
was rejected by the Court because it failed to embrace the required
guidelines and promptness and because "it is for Congress, not this
Court, to rewrite the statute."'
' 79
By refusing to construe the statute to remove the constitutional
infirmity, the Court moved far from the position it had adopted in
Scales.
172. 39 U.S.C. § 4006 (1971).
173. Id. § 4007.
174. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
175. Id. at 58.
176. 400 U.S. at 417.
177. Id. at 415.




Libertarians in the tradition of Justices Black and Douglas neces-
sarily take issue with any Supreme Court decision that (1) fails to
grant full, even "absolute," recognition to fundamental freedoms;
(2) employs a "balancing test" when none is justified and when bal-
ancing will most likely end with the pendulum swinging in the direc-
tion of authority rather than individual rights; or (3) sees as the
greater value the legitimate interests of society rather than the rights
of the individual. In numerous instances there was ample justifica-
tion for scholarly and libertarian criticism and for scorning as in-
consequential the role of the Court as guardian of civil liberties.
The record prior to Tot v. United States'80 and United States v.
Lovett'81 had scarcely earned the Court distinction in civil liberties
cases. However, the radical changes in posture between 1958182 and
1972183 evidence an entirely new and libertarian period in the Court's
history. The Court's decisions in compulsory self-incrimination 184
and other procedural due process cases;185 its limitation of the juris-
diction granted to military tribunals by the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice; 186 its use of the bill of attainder prohibition in United
States v. Brown;8 7 and its protection of both procedural' 88 and sub-
stantive8 9 rights in expatriation cases should not be classified as "rela-
tively minor matters."' 90 Much of the credit for this libertarian record
must go to the Warren Court which was responsible for protecting
180. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
181. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
182. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
183. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
184. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S.
70 (1965).
185. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1965).
186. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
187. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
188. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958).
189. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163
(1964).
190. D. LOCKARD, supra note 37.
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civil liberties in twenty-one of the foregoing cases including Aptheker,
Lamont and Robel. But the Burger Court, which came into being
on June 23, 1969, and which did not become fully operative until the
October Term, 1969, also shares in the distinction of protecting funda-
mental freedoms in United States v. United States District Court,
Schacht, Blount and Tilton.
In all probability, President Nixon's four appointees-Burger,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist-will produce a "strict construc-
tionist" Court in procedural due process cases, and they may persist
in viewing narrowly the scope of the first amendment, as they did in
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 191 Kleindienst v. Mandel 92 and
Branzburg v. Hayes.193 However, there is also the possibility that the
momentum in fundamental freedom cases may carry the Burger Court
into yet judicially-unexplored corners of the first amendment. This
latter prospect seems borne out by Blackmun's implied sanction of
the notion that the first amendment, among others, protects the right
of privacy.
1 4
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